While juristic and political discussion of international criminal justice pays some attention to the "tenuous connection between trials and deterrence" it generally ignores the complex debates and criminological literature on the efficacy of the general deterrent effect of domestic criminal justice systems. 4 When it is discussed, it is often in terms of the role, or lack thereof, of political will impacting international criminal justice's deterrent effect (i.e., realpolitik) and fails to consider the overwhelming evidence that suggests a strong deterrent effect of law is problematic. Instead, the efficacy of and/or potential of a deterrent effect is taken as an a'priori. For example, Judge Richard
Goldstone, former chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunals for Former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, states with an optimistic declaration, "In establishing the tribunals, the Security Council has struck a meaningful blow against impunity. It has sent a message to would-be war criminals that the international community is no longer prepared to allow serious war crimes to be committed without the threat of retribution." This view arises out of the modern conceptualization of law developed in the wake of the writings of Cesaere Beccaria and Jeremy Bentham and, as we will show below, out of a rationalized enlightenment view of the human mind. The deterrent effect claimed in these statements is optimistic given the criminological research on deterrence. This is not meant to disparage the work of the Tribunals, the International Criminal Court, or of the judicial processes and decisions overall, as they deal with grave and difficult cases and present complex evidentiary and legal challenges. This is also not the only population with a blind belief in the deterrent effects of law. Nonetheless, as an argument for the need of international criminal justice to be more inclusive and less exclusive, criminological insight can only enhance these processes and decisions by highlighting issues and processes that influence the nature of violations of law and are thus important to understand for case processing in international criminal justice.
The next two sections explore the theoretical and policy bearing of criminological thought to international criminal justice by drawing from the ideology and theory of deterrence and legitimacy. After all, both of these concepts are intertwined and of central relevance to ending impunity for heads of state and high ranking officials and constraining future incidences of international criminal law violations.
Deterrence 7 "I also fully accept, within the margin determined by the Appellant's individual guilt, the special emphasis on general deterrence….in particular when it is to prevent commanders in similar circumstances from committing similar crimes in the future".
8
The foundation of the rule of law is premised on the notion of social order and with the understanding that the laws that govern the broader social contract serve as specific and general deterrents. Thus, laws ideally serve to deter criminality. Prosecutions for such violations serve as a specific deterrent to the offender and as a general deterrent to others by means of solidifying the international norms prohibiting such behaviors by way of example. Deterrence then is a model of obedience.
9
The potential for deterrence to be effective at the international level is not far reaching. As street crime research has shown, social location and position strongly influences deterrence. committing a burglary or armed robbery are framed within an offenders' experiencing a 'pressing need for cash' produced through participation in a street-life subculture. As ADAM and New ADAM data collected in both the United States and the United Kingdom has shown, the majority of offenders are intoxicated at the time of their arrest and typically at the time of the commission of the crime. 14 Such irrationality is not limited to violators of ordinary crimes. Much testimony given before the Tribunal for Rwanda has highlighted the heavy use of alcohol and marijuana by the Interahamwe.
Child soldiers in Sierra Leone were often drugged before combat. Dutton et al 15 also
highlight the agitated and stressed emotional state that soldiers are in during armed conflict situations, which can overpower reason and spill over into atrocity level violence.
These emotive states will short circuit deterrent effects of law, thus national prosecutions of low-level offenders may have a retributive value but not a deterrent one as the mindset of the individual on-the-ground is not utilizing rational decision making mechanisms.
In the case of those most responsible for violations of international criminal law--rationality can be overshadowed by the sentiments of ideology, religion, nationalism and at the most basic level, power and politics. If we discount this and return to the premise that deterrence can work; that heads of state and other high ranking officials that orchestrate violations of law are rational and would not risk their social location or position; we may want to consider what other factors must come into play for general deterrence to materialize.
Consider that in the form of specific deterrence, control mechanisms typically, come into play long after the criminal actions are over and the viability and integrity of the state which has committed them has been compromised, thus, not swiftly. focused not simply on the intensity of certainty, celerity and proportionality of punishment but rather the individual's perception of these elements.
However, most committers of atrocities do not perceive international law or a given country's law as a threat for prosecuting their behavior, especially given the history of impunity and common tactics which are employed to ensure deniability (e.g.,
propaganda, political pressures, plausible deniability, and techniques of neutralization).
We While having presented the basic tenants of deterrence and the relevance of legitimacy, the following section draws together these two concepts with current judicial precedent decision-making. After all, as in some cases, such decisions can prove to be counter-productive to ensuring the efficacy of deterrence, can facilitate the promotion of the de-legitimization of international criminal law, can hinder the perception of potential prosecution, and/or can in the end lead to additional impunity. Of course, the counter point to this is the need to ensure due process and indeed this is a real and grave concern. Yamashita was charged with 'unlawfully disregarding and failing to discharge his duty as a commander to control the acts of members of his command by permitting them to commit war crimes.' In finding Yamashita guilty, the Commission stated that when 'vengeful actions are widespread offences and there is no effective attempt by a commander to discover and control the criminal acts, such a commander may be held responsible, even criminally liable.' 29 Appeals Chamber Decision, para. 348 Therefore, the Appeals Chamber is not satisfied that the relevant trial evidence and the additional evidence admitted on appeal prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the Appellant is responsible under Article 7 (1) of the Statute for ordering the crimes committed in the Ahmic'i area on 16 April 1993. interpretation of the standard is not consistent with the jurisprudence of the Appeals Chamber in this regard and must be corrected accordingly." Crime, and Justice Vol.36, deniability occurs when said actor has the knowledge and at times actively participates in crime commission, directly and/or indirectly through orders, though it is guised in an effort to cover-up any factual evidence linking them to the crime. The process can, 1) involve the creation of power structures and chains of command loose and informal enough to be denied if necessary; 2) claiming the rogue actor scenario and/or; 3) create and/or destroy factual proof of command and/or directives to evade fulfillment of the requirements of burden of proof. As previously noted, the opportunity to either create a loose chain of command is relatively easy given the access to resources or the structure can be in its ideal format, yet resources are available to mask the tightness of the organization. An active policy of ensuring plausible deniability protects both the inner political elite circle and military leaders by limiting prosecutions to the lowest levels of involvement. This is the direct opposite of the stated goals of international criminal law and international criminal justice.
There is reason to believe that Blaškic successfully engaged in the use of this political practice. Consider the additional evidence, Exhibits 1, 13, 14, that was allowed during his Appeal that suggested the attack on Ahmici and the surrounding villages were 'revenge attacks' by rogue individuals. Recall the rogue actor scenario is a common tool used to divert attention from the chain of command. During the trial, however, Blaškic's testimony excluded this scenario. His testimony heard by the Trial Chamber claimed the attack was organized and planned at the level of command within a military hierarchical structure, contradicting the admitted evidence used by the Appeals Chamber. Consider
Blaškic's own words, "Q. At the time on TV cameras and addressing the entire population of the Lasva Valley, you said that the crime had been committed in an organised manner, systematically, on the basis of a plan, and under somebody's control or command. Could you explain those four points of your allegations? Why did you say that, first, that it was an organised systematic, planned and controlled operation?
A. First of all, it could not have been done by a group of three or four drunken persons, drunken soldiers, and that they had done it of their own accord. When I said that it was organised, I felt that there must have been some preparation behind it, preparation for such destruction…and when I say that it was under somebody's control, it means that I was sure that the group that committed it was under the control of an elected commander of its own."
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In light of the transcript from the trial, the additional evidence provided by the Appellant suggests the most common tactic of plausible deniability was used -chain of command loose and informal enough to be denied if necessary and the use of the few rogue soldiers scenario. While there are other issues with the additional evidence that was used in making their decision, 36 this evidence was used in making their judgment of command responsibility.
When the goal of international trials, as stated by the Appeals Chamber, is both, accountability and general deterrence, a lenient interpretation fuels the already well- ensuring impunity and weakening the potential of law and future prosecutions' general deterrent effect.
Conclusion
Beyond examinations of deterrence and legitimacy, criminologists have much to contribute to international criminal justice. As noted, there are social, political, cultural, and geographical issues that play a role in not only crime commission, but in the hindrance of and/or facilitation of deterrence. Criminologists are well positioned to show how these connections may facilitate or hinder the broader goals of the legal community.
As previously noted, even though those with the most at risk, significance of social location, are assumed to be the easiest to deter, other factors must come into play before international criminal law and international criminal justice can serve as deterrents. It must be perceived at the individual level that there is a certainty of risk of being caught, being held accountable. The enforcement mechanisms and law must be viewed favorable or have legitimacy not just at the collective level but by individuals in the position to violate these laws.
As such, the current rather blind belief in the deterrent impact of international criminal justice remains, regretfully, a bit premature. Additionally, as has been noted, as long as tried and true catalysts such as plausible deniability, use of a scapegoat, sacrificing underlings, or claiming the bad apple or rogue agent, can be successfully engaged and then not recognized and/or ignored in the judicial decision-making processes, a global deterrent effect will regretfully remain in the distant future. Simply, criminology has relevance to the understanding not only of crime commission and subsequent control, but also what impact the criminal justice system, laws, and
